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This paper explores the correlation between employment protection legislation (EPL) 
and the rate of workplace accidents, using a theoretical model and data for OECD 
countries. EPL has been rolled back in most OECD countries since the mid-80s. In 
parallel, there has been a decrease in the number of workplace accidents 
reported, especially non-fatal ones. We ask the question whether less employment 
protection could have contributed to the reduction in accident rates, for example 
by reducing workers’ willingness to report accidents. To investigate, we build a 
theoretical model, which suggests that the incentives to report workplace accidents 
are complex and could even result in a negative relationship between EPL and 
accident reporting. It is possible for example that labour market reforms reduce job 
security and incentivise behaviours that bring immediate benefits, like accident 
reporting. The empirical analysis, using a database of 16 OECD countries, supports 
the view that the dilution of EPL for regular contracts has increased the rate of 
accident reporting. This result is robust after controlling for a number of other factors, 
such as the unemployment rate, economic growth, unemployment benefits, trade 
union density and temporary work.  
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A lot of attention has been devoted to finding out what causes accidents, both 
fatal and non-fatal, at work. Amongst economists, this was first investigated by 
Kossoris (1938), who found that the number of workplace accidents varied pro-
cyclically. This led to a number of studies that looked at this issue using data on 
individual firms and workers (Schuster and Rhodes 1985; Ruhm 2000; Boone, van 
Ours, Wuellrich and Zweimüller 2011), industry data (Curington 1986; Arai and 
Thoursie 2005; Asfaw, Pana-Cryan and Rosa 2011), aggregate data for a country or 
territory (Wooden 1989; Mouza and Targoutzides 2012), and cross-national data 
(Boone and van Ours 2006).  
There is also a growing literature on the effects of employment protection legislation 
(EPL). Studies have focused on such things as its effects on the rate and structure of 
unemployment (Nickell 1997; Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel 2005; Sarkar 2013), self-
employment and entrepreneurship (Robson 2003; Torrini 2005; Baumann and Brändle 
2012), productivity (Nickell and Layard 1999; Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009; 
Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007), investment - both foreign (Görg 2005; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2005; Radulescu and Robson 2008; Wood, Yin, Mazouz and Cheah 2016) 
and domestic (Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli 2005; Radulescu and 
Robson 2013) – and absenteeism (Ichino and Riphahn 2005; Frick and Malo 2008).  
In this paper, we focus on the effect of EPL on the rate of workplace accidents, an 
aspect neglected so far. A series of labour market reforms in OECD countries has 
reduced the level of employment protection in the past 30 years. At the same time 
a downward trend in the rate of workplace accidents is observed in these countries. 
We investigate whether there is a correlation between these trends; for example 
with lower employment protection workers may be afraid to report accidents for 
fear of losing their job.  
Table 1 shows the number and incidence of workplace accidents in 1990 and 2011. 
There are substantial differences between countries, with Portugal showing the 
highest incidence of accidents in the workplace, followed closely by Spain - at least 
as far as the number of non-fatal accidents is concerned.1 The United Kingdom, 
Greece and Ireland on the other hand are the ‘safest’ places to work. The main 
thing that stands out is that over the twenty-one years shown here there has been a 
substantial decrease in accidents at work in almost all of the countries for which we 
have data, most notably in the case of non-fatal accidents.  
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                
1 The Netherlands seems to be something of an outlier here in terms of the rate of non-fatal 
accidents. This is due to a change in the source for these figures from insurance records 
before 1989 to the Working Conditions Survey for more recent figures from 2010 onwards. In 
the empirical work included in this study we control for this by using a dummy variable to 
denote a structural shift in the way that these figures are calculated. See the Appendix for 






A look at the recent history of EPL using data compiled by the OECD suggests that 
over the period from 1985 to 2013 there is also a decrease in the level of 
employment protection legislation in most of the countries studied (see Figure 1). The 
OECD indicator is scaled to lie between a minimum value of 0, corresponding to 
very weak EPL, and a maximum of 6, corresponding to very strict employment 
protection. The indicator refers to the rules affecting regular (permanent) workers 
dismissed on personal grounds or economic redundancy but without fault. The data 
illustrated in Figure 1 indicate that the overall strictness of EPL tends to be highest in 
the southern European countries – Portugal, Italy and Spain – and weakest in the 
USA, Canada and the United Kingdom. A number of countries – Portugal, Spain and 
Greece among them – introduced measures to relax the strictness of EPL in their 
economies between 1985 and 2013.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The index of employment protection legislation has three distinct components – i.e. 
the procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal 
process, such as notification procedures and delay before notice can start (EPL1); 
the length of the notice period and the amount of severance pay to those dismissed 
(EPL2); and finally the difficulty of dismissal as determined by the circumstances in 
which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if 
a dismissal is found to be unfair, such as compensation and reinstatement (EPL3).2 
Figure 2 shows the cross-country averages for the components of employment 
protection, suggesting that these reforms span all of the three components. 
 
Figure 2 about here   
 
In most countries legislation prohibits firing a worker for reporting workplace injuries. 
Even in the US, the country with the least employment protection in Figure 1 the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 protects workers against any sort of 
retaliation (including dismissal) for exercising their rights with regards to health and 
safety at work.3 In the UK, another country with relatively relaxed employment 
protection laws the main piece of legislation is the Employment Rights Act, passed in 
1996, which lists dismissal related to health and safety among the unfair reasons for 
dismissal. 4 
                                                
2 See the Appendix for more details of what is included in these measures of EPL. 
3 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) provides an overview of legislation in various 
countries. 
4 The Employment Rights Act in fact formally codified already existing laws passed in the 60s, 
70s and 80s so it did not lead to a big jump in the employment protection index represented 





Many European countries with high levels of employment protection have 
attempted to reform their labour markets to allow more flexibility. The drivers of 
reform have been the competitive pressures created by the Single Market in the 
early 90s and the pressures of the single currency, especially after the financial crisis 
that enveloped the euro area in 2009. Between November 2011 and October 2013, 
Portugal, which experienced the largest reductions in employment protection, has 
significantly reduced the amount of entitlement to severance pay for new hires 
(while largely preserving the accumulated rights of existing workers). In addition, 
Portugal has attempted to ease the definition of fair dismissal through the 
introduction of a new reason for dismissal – inadaptability with change to the nature 
of a job - and it has introduced performance-related criteria for dismissing workers in 
the case of the extinction of a work position. As a result of these reforms the 
stringency of EPL is now closer to the OECD average (see OECD, 2017, for further 
details). 
The relaxation of regulation for regular contracts was accompanied in many 
countries by an increase in permissiveness of temporary work, which resulted in an 
increase in the share of temporary workers. The reform of regulation regarding 
temporary contracts has affected both standard and agency contracts but it is in 
the area of agency work that the reforms have been at their deepest. During the 
1980s most countries allowed agency work only in specific industries and in some 
countries work agencies were illegal (Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden stand out 
in this respect). Reforms started in most countries by the mid-1990s, preceding the 
European directive of 1999 that extended the rights of permanent workers to 
standard temporary workers, but not agency workers. By 2011 agency work was 
allowed in all countries and within countries in most industries. The rules regarding the 
maximum period allowed for agency contracts has lengthened in most countries 
although there are still restrictions to the number of such contracts that can be 
offered. These regulatory changes are reflected in an increase in the share of 
temporary workers from 9% in 1985 to 12% in 2011 (based on OECD data). 
The OECD quantifies the restrictions on the use of fixed term or agency work and the 
cumulative duration / number of such contracts that are allowed on a scale from 1 
(few restrictions on the use of temporary contracts) to 6 (temporary contracts can 
only be used in certain situations). Figure 3 shows the evolution of this variable over 
time and indicates a general tendency towards loosening the restrictions around the 
use of temporary work. In addition, Figure 3 plots the share of temporary workers, 
available from the OECD Employment Database. Clearly the effect of the removal 
of restrictions on temporary contracts is accompanied by an increase in the share of 
temporary workers.  
 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
To analyse the effect of employment protection on accident reporting we first 
introduce incentives in a theoretical model based on efficiency wages. While 





afraid of reporting accidents for fear of losing their job the model shows that the 
relationship is more complex. In an efficiency wages framework incentives could 
work in the opposite direction – a reduction in employment protection, by reducing 
the expected value of a job, may incentivise workers to report accidents. We then 
use a cross-country panel dataset of 16 OECD countries to test the relationship 
between EPL and workplace accidents. Our hypothesis is that EPL has an effect on 
workers’ incentives to report an accident rather than the true rate of accidents. If 
this is the case, then the effect should be evident in the case of non-fatal accidents 
but should be absent from fatal accidents, whose reporting is not subject to 
incentives. We control for unemployment, GDP growth, the replacement ratio and 
trade union density, and consider the role of temporary contracts.  
2 DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION MATTER FOR 
WORKPLACE INJURIES? A MODEL OF INCENTIVES 
A worker who suffers a minor workplace injury can decide whether to report the 
accident or not. In cases in which the employer could easily dismiss a worker who is 
prone to accidents in the workplace, it is more likely that the employee would refrain 
from reporting the accident. This is supported by the OECD (1989), who note 
amongst the social and psychological factors that influence workplace accident 
statistics that “workers may not report injuries because they fear loss of attendance 
bonuses, or other personal disadvantages, such as becoming prime candidates for 
redundancy”. This suggests that the relationship between the rate of non-fatal 
workplace accidents and the strictness of EPL depends on incentives. 
In what follows, the relationship between EPL and accident reporting is captured by 
a model based on the efficiency wage framework, in which the reporting of 
accidents depends on the wage level.5 A high wage makes it costly for workers to 
claim compensation for accidents if this action makes it more likely that they will lose 
their job. Also high wages may be perceived by workers as a ‘gift’ and reduce their 
willingness to impose costs on the firm.6 We focus on the role of incentives by 
keeping the true rate of accidents constant.  
2.1 THE RESERVATION WAGE 
It is assumed that workers have an incentive to report accidents because every time 
they do so they receive some compensation from the firm. This compensation, 
denoted by 𝑐𝑐, must be interpreted in a broad sense, as a cost to the firm. 
Companies are generally insured against the risk of accidents but frequent 
compensation payments lead to higher insurance premiums. Also not all accidents 
attract financial compensation. Some accidents result only in sickness leave, which 
generates a benefit to the worker in the form of extra leisure but also a cost to the 
                                                
5 The standard efficiency wage framework (see the seminal paper of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
1984, among others) has been used to analyse sickness leave by Barmby, Sessions and Treble 
(1994). 
6 These arguments are also used in the efficiency wage literature to justify the link between 





firm in terms of lost output. Finally the incentive to report might be the desire to have 
the cause of the accident removed by the firm, in which case the compensation is 
in the form of a reduction in the probability of having an accident in the future. In 
effect 𝑐𝑐 represents the general benefit to the worker of reporting an accident and 
can take several forms, all of which are costly to the firm.   
Workers face an exogenous rate of separation, 𝛿𝛿, which is higher if they report an 
accident. Accidents happen with probability 𝜆𝜆 and if they are reported the worker 
receives compensation 𝑐𝑐, but faces a higher separation rate, 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴, with 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴  >  𝛿𝛿. In 
what follows, the probability of having an accident, 𝜆𝜆, is kept constant but the 
willingness to report may vary. We consider here only minor accidents so that 
workers have a choice of whether to report them or not. They choose to report the 
accident if the compensation they receive is higher than the cost. For a worker, the 
asset value of being employed can be written as 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑤𝑤 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 [𝑐𝑐 + (𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 −𝑟𝑟), 0] + 𝛿𝛿(𝑈𝑈 −𝑟𝑟),      (1) 
where 𝑟𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑤𝑤 is the wage, 𝑐𝑐 is the compensation, 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 is the value of 
being employed after reporting the first accident and 𝑈𝑈 is the value of being 
unemployed. After reporting an accident the worker receives compensation but 
faces a higher separation rate. This higher separation rate remains high for as long as 
the worker is employed, so any accidents that happen subsequently are reported – 
there is no gain from refraining to do so. The value of being employed becomes 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤 + λ𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴(𝑈𝑈 −𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴).          (2) 
If the workers lose their job they receive unemployment benefits and their accident 
reporting record is erased. While a worker searches for a new job, the value of being 
unemployed is 
𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃)(𝑟𝑟 −𝑈𝑈),         (3) 
where 𝑏𝑏 is the unemployment benefit net of search costs, 𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃) is the probability of 
finding a job if unemployed and 𝜃𝜃 is market tightness, i.e. the ratio of the number of 
vacancies to the number of unemployed, with 𝑞𝑞′(𝜃𝜃) > 0. The Beveridge curve links 
the vacancy rate (𝑣𝑣) to the unemployment rate (𝑢𝑢), with 𝑣𝑣′(𝑢𝑢) < 0, as a higher 
vacancy rate is usually associated with lower unemployment. This implies 𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃) =
𝑞𝑞(𝑣𝑣(𝑢𝑢)/𝑢𝑢) where 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢⁄ < 0.  
The reservation wage, which makes the worker indifferent between reporting and 
not reporting an accident is obtained by setting 𝑟𝑟 −𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 = 𝑐𝑐. With 𝑟𝑟 −𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 resulting 
from equations (1), (2) and (3) the reservation wage is 
𝑤𝑤� = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐
𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴−𝛿𝛿





 (𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 + 𝜆𝜆)𝑞𝑞′(𝜃𝜃) > 0. (4) 
We assume that EPL influences the rate of job separation by imposing firing costs on 
employers. We follow Boeri and van Ours (2008, p223-224) in modelling this firing cost 
as a deadweight loss to the employer, so that 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 and 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 = 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴0 − 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴1𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 and 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓 are the costs of firing non-reporting and reporting workers 
respectively, and 𝛿𝛿0, 𝛿𝛿1, 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴0 and 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴1 are positive constants. For simplicity we assume 





change 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 , 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓, or both. The firm prioritises workers who report accidents for 
redundancy, but also workers who are prone to accidents may be more likely to 
leave their jobs. In any case, we assume that 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴0 > 𝛿𝛿0, so even when the cost of firing 
is the same, a worker who reports accidents has a higher rate of job separation 
compared to a worker who does not. 
If workers are identical the rate of accident reporting is either zero (if wages are 
above the reservation wage) or 𝜆𝜆 (if wages are below the reservation wage). A fall 
in 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 alone (for example due to the introduction of legislation specifically prohibiting 
unfair dismissal following an injury sustained in the workplace, which has the effect of 
increasing 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓) can be shown to increase the reservation wage (
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�
𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴
< 0), which may 
increase accident reporting. By reducing the probability of becoming unemployed 
as a result of accident reporting, such a piece of legislation has the straight-forward 
effect of encouraging workers to report accidents. 
On the other hand, legal restrictions like those included in the Employment Rights 
Act (1996) in the UK protect workers against unfair dismissal and lower the probability 
of job separation for all workers, including accident prone ones, decreasing both 𝛿𝛿 
and 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴. Such a law would increase both 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 and 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓 leaving the gap between 
𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 and 𝛿𝛿 constant, in which case it is easy to see from (4) that this type of wide-
ranging legislation reduces the reservation wage, making it less likely that accidents 
get reported.7 The reduction in the job separation rate increases the value of being 
employed with or without reporting an accident but in such a way that the gap 
between 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 increases, making it less attractive to report accidents for a 
given compensation, 𝑐𝑐. Similarly, targeted EPL, which lowers 𝛿𝛿 but leaves 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 
unchanged also increases the gap between 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴, reducing in this way the 
reservation wage and accident reporting. For example legislation prohibiting 
dismissal in case of parental leave would be expected to have this effect. Another 
example of such a change in legislation, albeit in the opposite direction, is the 
introduction in 2013 of the Employee Shareholder Scheme in the UK, which allows 
firms to give new shares to employees in exchange for waiving some of the unfair 
dismissal rights (although not where dismissal is on health and safety grounds). In 
conclusion, we expect general labour market reforms that dismantle some of the 
EPL to reduce the expected value of future employment, increase the reservation 
wage, and incentivise behaviours that have immediate short term benefits, like 
reporting minor accidents in the hope of some form of compensation. 
Figure 4 represents the reservation wage as a function of market tightness assuming 
that matching between unemployed workers and jobs is made according to a 
Cobb-Douglas matching function. In this case, the probability of finding a job has 
the form 𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃) = 𝜆𝜆0𝜃𝜃1−𝛼𝛼, where 𝜆𝜆0 and 𝛼𝛼 are positive constants and 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. A 
                                                
7 This particular result is dependent on the linear form suggested by Boeri and van Ours 
(2008). A non-linear relationship between the rate of job separation and the cost of firing 
could result instead in the ratio rather than the difference between 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 and 𝛿𝛿 remaining 
constant. In this case an increase in the costs of firing across the board would have 
ambiguous effects on the reservation wage but nevertheless, the possibility that such a 





tighter labor market diminishes the threat of unemployment and therefore increases 
the wage above which workers refrain from reporting accidents.  
 
Figure 4 about here. 
 
The equilibrium wage is determined by a bargaining process between firms and 
workers as explained in the next section. This equilibrium wage, 𝑤𝑤∗, may be above or 
below the reservation wage. If 𝑤𝑤∗ < 𝑤𝑤� , on average 𝜆𝜆 percent of employees report 
accidents.8 If on the other hand 𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤� , it is still the case that on average 𝜆𝜆 percent 
of employees suffer accidents, but none of them are reported.  
2.2 THE JOB CREATION CONDITION AND THE NEGOTIATED WAGE  
The equilibrium wage is determined by a search and matching model (see 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).  Vacancies are filled following a search process, 
which is costly for the firm, but generates profit once a match is achieved. If 
accident reporting takes place, the value of employing a worker (𝐽𝐽) is determined 
by 
𝑟𝑟𝐽𝐽 = 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤 − 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿̅(𝑉𝑉 − 𝐽𝐽),         (5) 
where 𝑝𝑝 is the output of the match and 𝛿𝛿̅ is the average rate of separation, 𝛿𝛿̅ = 𝜆𝜆𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 +
(1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝛿𝛿. Minor accidents are costly as they entail some form of compensation, but 𝑐𝑐 
could also be interpreted as a temporary loss of productivity for example due to 
sickness absence. Job separation leaves the firm with a vacancy, which is costly to 
fill, but holds the promise of a future match. The value of a vacancy, 𝑉𝑉, satisfies  
𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 = −𝜆𝜆 + 𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃)(𝐽𝐽 − 𝑉𝑉),         (6) 
where 𝜆𝜆 is the search cost and 𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃) is the probability of filling the vacancy as a 
function of market tightness, 𝜂𝜂′(𝜃𝜃) < 0. Once a vacancy arises the firm has a choice 
between advertising it again (if 𝑉𝑉 > 0), or not (if 𝑉𝑉 < 0). Despite the costly search, the 
value of a vacancy can be positive, if the probability of finding a match and the 
profit obtained once a match is achieved are high enough. Profit maximisation and 
free entry however, require that the value of a vacancy be equal to zero in 
equilibrium. From (5) and (6), by imposing 𝑉𝑉 = 0 we obtain the job creation condition 
𝑤𝑤� = 𝑝𝑝 − 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿
�)
𝜂𝜂(𝜕𝜕)





< 0.     (7) 
Free entry and exit of firms on this market ensures that wages gravitate towards this 
level. Wages are negotiated between workers and firms in a bargaining process 
from which the workers extract a share of the surplus, 𝑟𝑟 −𝑈𝑈 + 𝐽𝐽 − 𝑉𝑉, in proportion 
with their bargaining power, 𝛽𝛽: 
                                                
8 We rely here on the law of large numbers. If the probability of having an accident is 𝜆𝜆 and 
we observe the incidence of accidents over a large number of periods the share of workers 





𝑟𝑟 −𝑈𝑈 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟 −𝑈𝑈 + 𝐽𝐽 − 𝑉𝑉).         (8) 
The surplus of the worker, 𝑟𝑟 −𝑈𝑈, is determined by equations (1), (2) and (3), while 
the surplus of the firm, 𝐽𝐽 − 𝑉𝑉, can be obtained from equation (6) by imposing 𝑉𝑉 = 0. 
The resulting negotiated wage is 












� > 0. (9) 
The job creation wage and the negotiated wage are represented together with the 
reservation wage in Figure 4 under the assumption of a Cobb Douglas matching 
function with 𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑚𝑚0
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
. Market tightness, 𝜃𝜃, reduces the probability of finding a 
worker, which reduces the value of a vacancy. The number of vacancies falls, which 
puts downward pressure on 𝑤𝑤�  - the job creation wage is negatively sloped. On the 
other hand higher 𝜃𝜃 increases the value of being unemployed because the 
probability of finding a job is higher. A tighter labour market therefore improves the 
negotiating position of the workers by giving them a better fall back option (or 
threat point) in case the negotiation fails to achieve a match. The opposite is true for 
the firm, whose fall back option 𝑉𝑉 is now lower. The resulting negotiated wage is 
higher so 𝑤𝑤�  in Figure 4 is upward sloping.  
The job creation wage in (7) and the negotiated wage in (9) result in an equilibrium 
wage, 𝑤𝑤∗, and market tightness, 𝜃𝜃∗. The figure shows the situation in which the 
equilibrium wage 𝑤𝑤∗ is below the reservation wage and therefore all accidents are 
reported. In this equilibrium 1 − 𝜆𝜆 percent of workers have no accidents and are paid 
𝑤𝑤∗, while 𝜆𝜆 percent of workers have accidents, claim compensation and get paid 
𝑤𝑤∗ + 𝑐𝑐. 
Changes in exogenous variables such as the rate of job separation, productivity, the 
negotiation powers, the level of compensation etc. can flip the equilibrium from 
reporting to non-reporting and back. As equilibrium wages rise above the reporting 
threshold they increase as the firm and the workers internalise the absence of 
accident claims. The workers demand higher wages because 𝜆𝜆 percent of them are 
deprived of compensation, while the firms are willing to pay higher wages because 
they have lower costs. Above 𝑤𝑤�  all workers are paid the same wage and none of 
them request compensation.9 A change in employment protection has an impact 
on all three schedules in Figure 4 through 𝛿𝛿 and 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴. 
2.3 THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
To find the effect of employment protection on equilibrium wages we consider first a 
reduction in the general level of employment protection, the kind of change that 
would reduce both 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 and 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓, increasing 𝛿𝛿 and 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴. Such legislation increases the 
                                                
9 In our theoretical model workers either report every accident or they do not report any. This 
all or nothing situation changes when we apply the model to data collected from a panel of 
countries. Variables such as the probability of having accidents, compensation, search costs 
and even negotiating powers are determined at the sectoral level within countries. 
Furthermore, workers in the model are identical in terms of preferences and productivity 
while the data may capture a great deal of heterogeneity. Any shock is expected to have a 
smoother effect on accident reporting, equilibrium wages and market tightness than that 





reservation wage as implied by Section 2.1 and as a result may increase accident 
reporting. But there is also an effect on equilibrium wages coming from changes in 
the job creation condition and wage negotiation process. 
A fall in the cost of firing workers has some advantages for the firm because it 
becomes easier to adjust to shocks that require a reduction in the number of workers 
(such as a negative productivity shock). With a higher rate of job separation 
vacancies arrive at a faster rate and the firm stops searching until the number of 
workers is reduced to the new optimum. In equilibrium though, higher turnover is 
costly so the job creation wage, 𝑤𝑤� , is lower. On the other hand a higher rate of job 
separation reduces the expected value of a job for the workers who in turn require 
higher wages, 𝑤𝑤� , to accept a job offer. Figure 5 represents graphically the effect of 
such an increase in the rate of job separation for the reservation wage, the job 
creation wage and the negotiated wage. The labour market is less tight in 
equilibrium but the effect on equilibrium wages is likely to be small. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Turning now to a reduction in employment protection only for accident reporting 
workers, which reduces 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓 and increases 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴, leaving 𝛿𝛿 unchanged, such change in 
legislation reduces the reservation wage 𝑤𝑤�  as implied by Section 2.1. This specific 
change in legislation however, has the same effects on the job creation condition 
and the negotiated wage as the wider ranging reform described in the previous 
paragraph and captured by Figure 5. From the point of view of a firm that already 
faces compensation claims, an increase in 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 increases turnover and reduces the 
job creation wage, 𝑤𝑤� , which shifts down as in Figure 5, but the shift is somewhat 
smaller because only 𝜆𝜆 percent of workers are affected. The effect of such a 
measure on the negotiated wage is also in the same direction to that shown in 
Figure 5. As workers push for higher wages in response to lower job security, 𝑤𝑤�  shifts 
up, albeit by less because only a fraction of workers are affected by the increase in 
𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴.  With lower reservation wages and a stable equilibrium wage, reporting may flip 
into non-reporting in this situation. 
In conclusion, whether labour market reforms increase the job separation rate only 
for workers who report accidents or for everyone, the equilibrium wage remains 
relatively stable, while market tightness is reduced. However the type of reform 
matters for the reservation wage, above which workers refrain from reporting 
accidents. As the equilibrium wage is relatively stable the effect of reforms on the 
reservation wage is crucial in determining whether workers report accidents or not. 
In the case of narrow reforms, which increase the rate of separation only for 
accident reporting workers, the reservation wage falls, which should reduce 
accident reporting if the reservation wage moves below the equilibrium wage. In 
the case of wider ranging reforms, which increase the rate of job separation for all 
workers regardless of whether they report accidents or not, the effect on the 
reservation wage is in the opposite direction – an increase. The effect may be an 





The index of employment protection used in our empirical analysis covers a wide 
range of measures, from notification procedures to reinstatement in case of unfair 
dismissal and is not specific about the causes of dismissal. Dismantling such 
legislation is likely to lower the costs of firing irrespective of the reasons that lead to 
this. In cases where labour market reforms are focused on weakening protection for 
accident reporting the theoretical results indeed point in the direction of less 
reporting taking place because workers are afraid of dismissal. But where reforms 
are wide ranging it is possible that reporting is increased due to the general 
reduction in job security, which makes the accident compensation relatively more 
attractive for workers who experience accidents. 
2.4 OTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Our theoretical framework has implications for the relationship between other 
variables and the number of accidents reported.  
The compensation level, 𝑐𝑐, and the probability of having an accident, 𝜆𝜆, both raise 
the reservation wage 𝑤𝑤� , making it more attractive for workers to report accidents. 
Higher compensation also reduces equilibrium wages as firms adjust to 
compensation claims by reducing the wage they pay. Higher probability of having 
an accident raises the temptation to claim because the frequency with which 
compensation is paid depends on the frequency of accidents. Firms however take 
this into account when they decide to open a vacancy and negotiate the wage 
with the workers. The equilibrium wages are likely to be pushed down as a result. 10 
The negotiating power of the workers relative to the firm, 𝛽𝛽, determines the outcome 
of wage bargaining. With higher negotiating power workers are able to push the 
negotiated wage, 𝑤𝑤� , higher and therefore achieve a higher equilibrium wage. 
Starting from a reporting situation the boost in wages may be enough to push 
equilibrium wages above the reservation wage and stop accident reporting. In a 
world where negotiating power has this narrow effect we would expect to see a 
reduction in reporting when workers’ power increases. However, workers’ 
negotiating power is often achieved through trade unions, which may have 
additional effects on the behaviour of firms and workers. For example the existence 
of a trade union may reduce the probability of having accidents by raising health 
and safety standards. Trade unions may also increase the costs of firing.  
Higher unemployment benefit, 𝑏𝑏, should increase accident reporting because it 
reduces the penalty associated with being unemployed (𝑤𝑤�  shifts up one for one with 
an increase in 𝑏𝑏 in Figure 4). But a higher unemployment benefit also raises 
equilibrium wages, making it less attractive to report (𝑤𝑤�  also shifts up one for one with 
                                                
10 The effect on the negotiated wage in equation (9) is somewhat more complicated as it 










. The ambiguity appears because a high penalty deters reporting – so a 
higher proportion of workers may suffer accidents, which reduces the negotiated wage, but 
few report them, which cushions the effect. The effect on the job creation wage in equation 





𝑏𝑏). The result is lower market tightness and higher unemployment but it is not clear 
whether any change occurs in reporting behaviour. We expect the unemployment 
benefit to have little if any effect on accident reporting.  
Higher productivity, 𝑝𝑝, increases the job creation wage, putting upward pressure on 
equilibrium wages. As the reservation wage is not directly affected, higher 
productivity should reduce reporting if the equilibrium wage moves above the 
reservation wage.  
3 DATA AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Following the theoretical model developed in the previous section, we estimate 
equations for the rate of workplace accidents – both non-fatal and fatal – focusing 
on the impact of employment protection legislation. The data used for this empirical 
analysis comes from the ILO Bureau of Statistics (LABORSTA) and focuses on 16 
countries in the OECD from 1985 until 2011.11 The Resolution concerning statistics of 
occupational injuries (resulting from occupational accidents) adopted by the 16th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Geneva 1998) defines an 
occupational injury to be any personal injury, disease or death resulting from an 
occupational accident. An occupational injury is therefore distinct from an 
occupational disease, which is a disease contracted as a result of an exposure over 
a period of time to risk factors arising from work activity. Data on occupational 
injuries are most frequently obtained from occupational accident reporting systems 
(e.g. to a labour inspectorate) or occupational injury compensation schemes. The 
type of source determines the coverage of the statistics. In many countries, the 
coverage of the statistics is limited to certain types of workers, usually employees 
only.  
Our set of control variables includes the unemployment rate and GDP growth rate to 
control for the effects of the business cycle. A negative sign on unemployment is 
expected if higher unemployment reduces the probability of finding a job and 
makes workers more cautious in reporting workplace accidents. Unemployment also 
captures the effect of labour market shocks that have an impact on equilibrium 
wages. GDP growth captures productivity shocks. As productivity drives equilibrium 
wages up in economic booms we should observe less accident reporting. But there 
is also evidence that expansion periods see an increase in new hires and work 
intensity as well as work stress, all of which can lead to a higher probability of having 
accidents (Davies et al. 2009; Palali and van Ours, 2017).  
We also add the log of trade union density and the unemployment benefit 
replacement ratio. Trade union density is included to control for workers’ bargaining 
power, which tends to raise equilibrium wages and reduce reporting. Apart from this, 
                                                
11 The countries analysed are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 





trade unions may also improve health and safety at work, reducing the number of 
accidents that occur.12  
Some sectors, such as mining, agriculture, construction and transport have a higher 
accident probability compared to other sectors, in which most workers are office-
based (Boone and van Ours, 2006, show accident rates by industry). Differences in 
industrial structure across countries and over time could therefore explain 
differences in accident rates. We add country-specific time trends to capture these 
effects. In addition, these country trends may also capture differential improvements 
in health and safety at work across countries and differences in data collection. 
Finally, dummy variables are introduced where there are changes in the definition of 
the dependent variable. These are usually due to changes in the revision of the 
International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) used by the ISO in compiling 
these statistics (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for further details).  
3.1 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
We begin by looking at the determinants of the rate of non-fatal accidents in the 
workplace. The first column of Table 2 shows a simple regression that features as its 
explanatory variables the log of the rate of unemployment (ln UR), GDP growth 
(GDP-GR) and an indicator based on the OECD measure of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation for regular contracts (EPL). The results suggest that 
an increase of 10% in the unemployment rate leads to a 5.6% drop in the rate of 
non-fatal accidents, while the coefficient on GDP growth is insignificant.  
Importantly, the coefficient on EPL is significant at 5%, indicating that higher 
employment protection for regular contracts results in less reporting of accidents.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Our next step is to introduce two additional control variables into the equation, 
trade union density (ln DEN) and the replacement ratio (RR). The results are 
presented in column (2). The coefficient on EPL remains significant, but the log of 
trade union density fails to achieve significance, a finding that is repeated 
throughout this table. However, the log of the replacement ratio is significant, 
suggesting that an increase in the replacement ratio for unemployment benefits has 
a positive effect on the rate of non-fatal accidents. This is to be expected, as 
workers are less afraid of unemployment, but the coefficient is very small. An 
increase in unemployment benefit of one percentage point increases the rate of 
non-fatal accidents by only 0.003%. We surmise that this is due to the increase in 
equilibrium wages, which acts as a deterrent for accident reporting. 
                                                
12 Related to this, Bryson (2016) notes that trade unions in Britain have a strong influence on 
the policy and practice of health and safety legislation. According to Bryson (2016) the 
Health and Safety Executive Board and its predecessor, the Health and Safety Commission, 
have a tripartite tradition, with appointments being made from the ranks of employers, trade 





There is some concern about the identification of results presented in columns (1) 
and (2). A causal link between EPL and workplace accidents cannot be established 
using OLS if EPL is endogenous. Although these results are obtained from within-
country time variation in regressions with country fixed effects, unobserved country-
specific shocks may generate unobserved correlation, making any causal claim 
impossible. Additionally, reverse causation may be at work at the country level, as 
employment protection regulation may be driven by the need to protect workers 
who report accidents. Unemployment and the rate of growth may also be affected 
by endogeneity because any reporting behaviour has an impact on hiring and firing 
of workers.13 Columns (3) and (4) repeat the earlier estimations but use two stage 
least squares (2SLS) employing the one-year lag of the explanatory variables as 
instruments to control for endogeneity.14 
The results are similar for most variables, except that the coefficient on EPL becomes 
larger in absolute terms. Least squares estimations suggest a reduction in EPL of one 
unit increases reporting by 17-19%, while 2SLS estimates suggest a much bigger 
increase, of 30-33%. In reality countries generally undertake reforms in small steps so 
that changes in EPL from one year to another tend to be smaller than one. It is more 
informative to look at the effect of the change in EPL over the whole period. Based 
on the reduction in cross country mean EPL between 1985 and 2011 and using the 
coefficients in Table 2, we conclude that the fall in employment protection for 
regular workers is associated with an increase of about 3.5-6.5% in NFA.15  
Our results so far suggest two possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive: EPL has 
an effect on the true rate of accidents, or EPL has an effect on the willingness to 
report accidents. To find out whether EPL influences incentives it is helpful to analyse 
the rate of fatal accidents. Fatal accidents tend to be reported more accurately 
than non-fatal accidents and therefore the willingness to report should play a 
smaller role. If incentive effects are strong we would not expect to see a correlation 
with EPL when we look at the rate of fatal accidents (Boone and van Ours 2006 and 
Davies, Jones and Nunez 2009 also make this distinction when studying the 
cyclicality of workplace accidents). If cyclical variations in accident reporting are 
                                                
13 Unemployment in our theoretical model is endogenous. In equilibrium the flows into 
unemployment should equal the flows out of unemployment, therefore (1 − 𝑢𝑢∗) × 𝛿𝛿̅ = 𝑢𝑢∗ ×
𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃∗), which results in an equilibrium rate of unemployment 𝑢𝑢∗ = 𝛿𝛿
�
𝛿𝛿�+𝑞𝑞(𝜕𝜕∗)
. A higher rate of job 
separation induced by labour market reforms reduces market tightness as in Figure 5 and 
increases equilibrium unemployment. This is the case regardless of whether reporting of 
accidents takes place and regardless of whether reforms touch only 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 or both 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 and 𝛿𝛿. 
Indeed, any other shock that has effects on market tightness will affect both the rate of 
unemployment and accident reporting. 
14 The instruments used are the first lags of the right hand side variables, all the dummies and 
trends. We report the F-statistic for the excluded instruments from the first stage regression of 
EPL on the instruments (the F-statistics for the first stage regressions of the other variables on 
the right hand side are not reported but the null of no correlation is rejected in all cases). We 
also report the Kleiberger-Paap (2006) under-identification test statistic, which is 
recommended when the system is just-identified and robust standard errors are calculated. 
15 The calculations here are based on the change in cross country mean EPL index between 
1985 and 2011, which takes the value ΔEPL= -0.22 units. The percentage change in NFA is 
calculated as 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼×∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 1, where 𝛼𝛼 is the coefficient on EPL from Table 2. The range of results 





also due to incentives rather than changes in the true rate of accidents, 
unemployment should also appear as insignificant, as suggested by Boone and van 
Ours (2006). On the other hand the rate of GDP growth may be positively related to 
the rate of fatal accidents as the effect of cyclical work stress occurs for non-fatal as 
well as fatal accidents (see Palali and van Ours 2017). The estimates in Table 3, 
which repeats the regressions estimated for the rate of non-fatal accidents, for the 
most part tend to support this. The coefficients on both the log of the unemployment 
rate and the index of EPL appear to be mostly insignificant throughout this table. We 
do not find any evidence of an increase in fatal accidents during booms.16 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The effects of trade union density are more difficult to explain. It appears that higher 
trade union density is associated with a higher rate of fatal accidents. This result does 
not hold for non-fatal accidents – trade union density has no significant effect in 
Table 2. There is little evidence on the effect of trade unions on work accidents. 
Trade unions tend to increase wages and therefore reduce the incentives to report 
accidents for a given unemployment level. They also claim to reduce accidents by 
involving workers in health and safety decisions. While these factors indicate that the 
correlation between trade union density and accidents reported should be 
negative, trade unions also strive to improve the reporting of accidents. The 
ambiguity of the correlation is compounded by the possibility that union 
membership may be more attractive in riskier industries. Fenn and Ashby (2004), 
using UK data also find a positive effect of trade union membership on serious injuries 
(including fatal).  They suggest this result is likely to be due to the involvement of 
trade unions in ensuring full disclosure of accidents. In addition, it is worth noting that 
Bryson (2016) finds that an increase in trade union density leads to a higher 
perceived level of risk in the workplace. 
In conclusion, our results so far indicate that the effect of EPL on workplace 
accidents is due to changes in reporting behaviour rather than changes in 
workplace safety. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing the degree of 
employment protection should lead to less reporting of accidents as workers fear 
dismissal. However, the model in Section 2 suggests that wide ranging reforms to the 
labour market, which make it easier to fire workers for any reason could have the 
opposite effect on accident reporting. By reducing the expected value derived 
from employment, a higher probability of dismissal may increase accident reporting. 
The fall in our measure of employment protection over time captures broad labour 
market reforms undertaken by most countries and in all areas of labour market 
regulation.  
                                                
16 It is likely that the lack of significance of our GDP growth variable throughout the 
regressions is explained by our use of country trends and year dummies. Palali and van Ours 
(2017) find a significant effect for GDP growth on fatal accidents when they omit country 
trends and year dummies. When both of these are added the coefficient on GDP growth 





3.2 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
The evidence that we have gathered so far suggests that labour market reforms 
aimed at reducing employment protection have increased the reporting of non-
fatal accidents. To investigate this result a little further we first divide the employment 
protection index into its subcomponents (EPL1, EPL2 and EPL3 as identified in Figure 
2) to find the effect of different types of legislation on non-fatal accidents.   
Table 4 reports the results of further 2SLS regressions in which the dependent variable 
is the log of the rate of non-fatal accidents. Columns (1) to (4) use the components 
of EPL as regressors. It appears that results for EPL are mainly driven by a reduction in 
the notification and delay procedures as encapsulated by EPL2, although EPL1 is 
also significant at 5% when introduced in the regression on its own. EPL3 is only 
marginally significant in column (4), also with a negative sign. The results continue to 
indicate that the rate of non-fatal accidents is negatively related to the log of the 
unemployment rate and positively related to the unemployment benefit 
replacement ratio. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
We also check that our results hold when temporary contracts are taken in to 
consideration because countries with strict employment protection for regular 
contracts sometimes allow the widespread use of temporary contracts to introduce 
flexibility on the labour markets (see Palali and van Ours 2017, who study the 
importance of temporary contracts for Italy and Spain). Several papers investigate 
differences in accident rates between temporary and permanent workers (Virtanen 
et al. 2005, provide a review of the evidence) although they fail to draw a clear 
conclusion on whether temporary work increases the risk of accidents. There is some 
evidence that temporary workers have a higher risk of occupational injury, which 
can be attributed to their lack of experience on the job. Against this, Davies et al. 
(2009) find that at the sectoral level the rate of minor injuries is negatively related to 
the share of temporary workers, whilst the rate of major accidents is independent of 
this share.   
To see whether temporary contracts change our conclusion about the effect of 
employment protection, we add two variables to our estimations, Temp1, which is 
the OECD index quantifying the restrictions placed on the use of temporary 
contracts, and Temp2, which is the share of temporary workers (both of these are 
represented in Figure 3). The regression results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 4. It is apparent that these two variables are not significant and they do not 
affect the coefficient for EPL, which has about the same magnitude and 
significance as in Table 2. The conclusion is that once we control for unemployment, 
which constitutes a clear deterrent for accident reporting, employment protection 
reduces the incentives of workers to report workplace accidents. This negative 





legislation we consider and after controlling for the presence of temporary 
contracts.17 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the effect of employment protection legislation on 
workplace accidents. Overall the trend in most countries in the sample is towards 
reducing all aspects of labour market regulation. Over the same period the 
incidence of non-fatal and fatal accidents decreased. We investigate whether 
there is a correlation between these two trends, in particular whether lower 
employment protection contributes to the downward trend in accident reporting by 
reducing the incentives of workers to report workplace accidents. 
Our theoretical analysis suggests that making it easier for firms to fire workers who 
report accidents indeed has the effect of reducing such reporting. On the other 
hand wide ranging labour market reforms, which make it easier for employers to 
dismiss employees for a range of reasons, may reduce the expected value of future 
employment and in turn incentivise workers to report accidents.  Our empirical 
analysis supports the latter conjecture: rather than contributing to the downward 
trend in accident reporting, labour market reforms appear to have slowed it down. 
We provide evidence that the reduction in a broad measure of employment 
protection regulation in our sample of countries is associated with an increase in the 
rate of non-fatal accidents. This effect is not present for fatal accidents, suggesting 
that the effects we identify are due to variations in the willingness of workers to 
report accidents rather than to changes in workplace safety.  
Further investigation focused on the components of employment protection 
legislation reveals that reductions in the length of notice period and amount of 
severance pay offered to dismissed employees tend to stimulate the reporting of 
non-fatal accidents. Furthermore, results do not change when we account for the 
concomitant spread of temporary contracts, which is another consequence of 
labour market reforms.  
The paper suggests that the unemployment rate is a strong deterrent for accident 
reporting, supporting the evidence first provided by Boone and van Ours (2006). A 
10% increase in the rate of unemployment produces, on average, a decrease in the 
rate of non-fatal accidents of about 5-6%. This would suggest that recessions are 
good for workplace safety, but since the result does not extend to fatal accidents 
we must conclude that the cyclical fluctuations in the rate of non-fatal accidents 
are due to changes in the willingness to report rather than the actual rate of 
accidents.  
                                                
17 We added an interaction term between EPL and Temp2, but it turned out to be 
insignificant. We also checked the robustness of the results by taking out Canada, 
Switzerland and the US, for which there is no variation in EPL. The results are little changed. 
Finally, we omitted Portugal and Spain, which have a lot of variation in EPL and the results 
remain strong for EPL2, but are somewhat weaker for the aggregate EPL. While omitting 
Portugal makes little difference, Spain has a stronger influence on our results. Without Spain 





We also find that the rate of non-fatal workplace accidents is an increasing function 
of the unemployment benefit replacement ratio, but the effect is very small. On one 
hand workers become less afraid of losing their job, so they are more likely to do 
things that increase their probability of dismissal, such as making accident claims at 
work.  But on the other hand workers are paid more, which increases the value they 
place on keeping their job and this dampens the positive effect. Finally the number 
of fatal accidents at work is increasing in trade union density, which may be due to 
better disclosure of accidents although it is not clear why this effect does not extend 
to non-fatal accidents as well. 
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The data on workplace accidents is collected from the ILO Bureau of statistics 
LABORSTA database, which is available from http://laborsta.ilo.org/. The sources of 
information by country are published below in Table A.1.   
 
Table A.1 
 Sourcea Subjectb Minimum 
period (days) 
Period Breaksc 
Belgiumd FA 82 1 1984-2012 s93-97, s98-04 
Canada FA 82 1 1985-2011  
Denmark FF 81 1 1978-2011 s91-01 
Finland FA 82 3 1978-2011 s93-07 
France FA 82 1 1975-2010  
Germanye FA 82 4 1990-2011  
Greece FA 82 1 1979-2003 s82-03 
Ireland FF 81 4 1976-2011 s90-07 
Italy FA 82 4 1979-2011 s91-08 
Netherlands FA/WC 81 1 1976-2012 s11-12 
Portugal FA 81 1 1979-2007 s89-07 
Spaine FA 81 1 1980-2012 s88-08 
Sweden FA 81 1 1979-2012 d94 
Switzerland FA 82 1 1984-2011  
United 
Kingdom 
FF 81 3 1986-2011 d98 
United States DA 81 1 1976-2012  
a ILO classification. Source: FA= insurance records, WC = Working Conditions Survey; 
FF = labour inspectorate records, DA= labour related establishment survey. 
b Subject: 81 = reported, 82 = compensated. 
c Breaks in series as accounted for in the empirical analysis; s = shift concerning a 
time period; d = dummy variable for a particular year. 
d Including commuting accidents. 







Harmonised unemployment rates as percentage of active population are from the 
OECD Labour Force Statistics, accessed at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/harmonised-unemployment-rates_2074384x-table6. 
Employment protection legislation and the incidence of temporary work 
We use the summary indicator of the strictness of EPL compiled by the OECD, which 
varies between 0 and 6. EPL refers to the rules affecting regular (permanent) workers 
dismissed on personal grounds or economic redundancy, but without fault 
(unweighted average of EPL1, EPL2 and EPL3): 
EPL1 quantifies procedural inconvenience (notification procedures and number of 
days of delay before notice can start); 
EPL2 covers the number of months of notice required and amount of severance pay 
(in number of months pay) for no-fault individual dismissal; 
EPL3 quantifies the difficulty of dismissal (the definition of justified / unfair dismissal, 
length of trial period in months, typical compensation following unfair dismissal after 
20 years of tenure in months pay and possibility of reinstatement following unfair 
dismissal); 
Temp1 refers to rules affecting standard fixed-terms contracts and temporary-work-
agency employment. It quantifies the circumstances in which temporary contracts 
are allowed, and the maximum number and cumulated duration of these contracts. 
Details of the methods used to construct values of the employment protection 
indicators may be found in Venn (2009, Annex A, p. 39). The data are obtainable 
from the following link: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/oecdindicatorsof
employmentprotection.htm.  
Temp2 is the share of temporary employment. Temporary employment includes 
wage and salary workers whose job has a pre-determined termination date. It is 
measured as a percentage of dependent employees – i.e. wage and salary 
workers. Figures can be obtained from the OECD, at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TEMP_I#   
Civilian Employment and Trade Union Density 
Trade union density is calculated as the ratio of the number of wage and salary 
earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and 
salary earners. Figures are obtainable from the Online OECD Employment Database 
at: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm. 





Gross replacement rates express gross unemployment benefits as a percentage of 
previous gross earnings. OECD figures are obtainable from 
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm. These figures are only 
available bi-annually and therefore it is necessary to interpolate the missing data.   
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Note: Mean value of the indicator of employment protection legislation for the 15 
countries in our sample for the following variables: EPL1 = OECD employment 
protection measure for notification procedures and the delay involved before 
notice can start; EPL2 = OECD employment protection measure for length of notice 
period and severance pay to employees dismissed by the employer; EPL3 = OECD 
employment protection measure for unfair dismissals. 













































Figure 3. The Share of Temporary Employment and Regulation of Temporary 
Contracts 
 
Note: The data are cross-country yearly average values. The share of temporary 
workers is missing for some countries in the early years – the graph is based on the 
data available each year (minimum 9 countries). The regulation of temporary 
workers measures the strictness of regulation on the use of fixed-term and temporary 
work agency contracts. 
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Fatal accidents Non-fatal accidents Fatal accidents 
Non-fatal 
accidents 
Number 0.01% Number 
(‘000) 
% Number 0.01% Number 
(‘000) 
% 
Belgium 106 0.3 115 3.0 82 0.2 85 1.9 
Canada 943 0.7 594 4.5 361 0.2 216 1.2 
Denmark 71 0.3 45 1.7 40 0.1 42 1.5 
Finland 74 0.3 103 4.1 26 0.1 51 2.1 
France 1213 0.5 760 3.2 529 0.2 659 2.6 
Germany 1558 0.4 1670 4.6 664 0.2 1007 2.5 
Greece 84 0.2 28 0.7 107 0.3 15 0.4 
Ireland 49 0.4 31 0.3 49 0.3 79 0.4 
Italy 1423 0.7 922 4.3 621 0.3 403 1.8 
Netherlands 59 0.1 656 1.0 49 0.1 908 10.8 
Portugal 203 0.5 305 6.8 276 0.5 174 3.4 
Spain 1446 1.1 695 5.4 335 0.2 511 2.9 
Sweden 117 0.3 87 1.9 58 0.1 28 0.6 
Switzerland 182 0.5 146 3.8 129 0.4 94 2.0 
United 
Kingdom 359 0.1 184 0.7 171 0.1 171 0.4 
United 
States 2900 0.2 3124 2.6 4693 0.3 1181 0.8 
         







Table 2. Econometric Analysis: Non-Fatal Accident Rates (ln NFA) 
Explanatory variables    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Constant  4.289***  4.333***  4.588*** 5.088*** 
 (24.49)  (9.96) (18.44) (9.44) 
ln UR -0.559*** -0.557*** -0.574*** -0.551*** 
  (8.32)  (8.50) (7.25) (7.76) 
GDP-GR  0.007  0.008*  0.006  0.010 
  (1.51)  (1.66) (0.65) (1.025) 
EPL -0.170** -0.158** -0.287*** -0.267** 
  (2.53)  (2.28)  (2.67)  (2.47) 
ln DEN  -0.025   -0.162 
   (0.25)    (0.17) 
RR   0.003**   0.004* 
   (2.02)   (1.93) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.985  0.988  0.989 0.989 
LL 375.27  377.12    
F-stat. of excluded instruments   88.41*** 56.76*** 
K-P rk LM stat, 𝜒𝜒2(1)   19.35*** 18.55*** 
Number of observations 370  370  354 354 
Estimation Method  LS   LS 2SLS            2SLS 
Notes: Each equation contains fixed effects for countries and calendar years, 
country-specific time trends and dummy variables for structural breaks (see the Data 
Appendix for more details). The variables are: NFA = the rate of non-fatal accidents; 
UR = the unemployment rate; GDP-GR = the rate of growth of real GDP; EPL = OECD 
employment protection measure concerned with individual dismissals for employees 
on regular contracts; DEN = trade union density; RR = the replacement rate for 
unemployment benefits. Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. *** (**) (*) denotes 
significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level on a two-tailed test. LL = log likelihood. F-stat. 
of excluded instruments = F-statistic from the first stage regression of EPL on the 
instruments. K-P rk LM stat. = Under-identification test, Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. 
Estimation method used: LS = least squares; 2SLS = two stage least squares estimation 
using the first lags of all the right hand side variables, all dummy variables and 






Table 3. Econometric Analysis: Fatal Accident Rates (ln FA) 
Explanatory variables    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Constant -0.130*** -3.864*** -0.990** -4.367** 
 (4.21)  (3.58)  (2.49)  (3.05) 
ln UR -0.105 -0.207 -0.085 -0.238 
 (0.62)  (1.38)  (0.41)  (1.31) 
GDP-GR -0.001 -0.003  0.004 -0.002 
 (0.08)  (0.29)  (0.18)  (0.08) 
EPL -0.049 -0.051 -0.170 -0.190 
 (0.49)  (0.53)  (1.22)  (1.32) 
ln DEN   0.741***    0.994*** 
   (2.89)    (2.72) 
RR  -0.0004  -0.0008 
   (0.17)   (0.02) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.909 0.911  0.918  0.921 
LL 112.56 118.56     
F-stat. of excluded instruments   98.44*** 62.31*** 
K-P rk LM stat, 𝜒𝜒2(1)   28.38*** 24.89*** 
N 389 389  372  372 
Estimation Method  LS  LS  2SLS  2SLS 
Notes: Each equation contains fixed effects for countries and calendar years, 
country-specific time trends and dummy variables for structural breaks. FA = the rate 
of fatal accidents. The instruments and tests are the same as in Table 2. See the 
notes to Table 2 for further details.  
33 
 
Table 4. Further Analysis (ln NFA) – Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Explanatory variables     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Constant   5.599***   4.633***   5.205***  4.748***  4.845***  4.944*** 
  (11.41)   (8.55)  (9.55)  (9.04)  (8.45)  (7.15) 
ln UR -0.541*** -0.563*** -0.553*** -0.579*** -0.531*** -0.437*** 
  (6.11)   (8.36)  (6.19)  (5.99)  (7.86)  (3.33) 
GDP-GR  0.001  0.013  0.001  0.0002  0.012  0.016 
  (0.08)  (1.23)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (1.22)  (0.65) 
EPL     -0.254** -0.271** 
      (2.55)  (2.33) 
EPL1 -0.052 -0.080**     
  (1.01)  (2.08)     
EPL2 -0.243**  -0.363***    
  (2.40)   (3.40)    
EPL3 -0.213   -0.274*   
  (1.24)    (1.83)    
Temp1         0.040  
          (1.08)  
Temp2       0.133 
        (1.38) 
ln DEN -0.178 -0.141 -0.179 -0.056 -0.031 -0.227 
  (1.23)  (0.95)  (1.18)  (0.32)  (0.79)  (1.30) 
RR 0.003*  0.004**  0.004**  0.005***  0.004**  0.001 
 (1.93)  (2.02)  (1.97)  (2.75)  (1.97)  (0.96) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.985 0.986  0.985 0.985  0.986  0.991 
N  354  354   354  354   354   282 




EPL1 53.17*** EPL2 34.90*** EPL3 16.53*** EPL 47.32*** EPL 35.43*** 
K-P rk LM stat, 𝜒𝜒2(1) 18.87*** 19.28*** 17.17*** 20.71*** 17.67*** 5.20** 
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
The additional variables are: EPL1 = OECD employment protection measure for notification procedures and the delay involved before notice 
can start; EPL2 = OECD employment protection measure for length of notice period and severance pay to employees dismissed by the 
employer; EPL3 = OECD employment protection measure for unfair dismissals. Temp1 = OECD measure of the strictness of regulation affecting 
the use of temporary contracts; Temp2 = the log of the proportion of employees on temporary contacts. See Table 2 for further notes. 
